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TAX REFORM IN RUSSIA:
ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
THROUGH PERSUASION

Camille Jackson

Abstract
Despite tremendous diffimlties ill the past, the Cltrrmt Russian ttlX system is pelj(JI'millg surprisingly well. Hl!lllellCl', while Russian gOlJermnent officials have effictively
ttlckled many olthe ecollomic and logistiCflI problems embedded ill the laws themselves,
area still calls/lJr re/lIJ'In: uoll/ntary compliance. This /llctor alone sets the Russian
tClX systl'm apart jiwil most systems in the
and Europe, £IS Rwsians haul' tmded

0111'

u.s.

Clway fi'Olll tClX compliance jiN centuries. fuse Cln explanatioll

{ifpersuClsion to show

how the RussiClI/ gOllermnmt cillZ-mld is-garnering /lolulllary compliance from its
citizms, using fl persuasioll chain in which per51lasion trtllisf/:rsfrom illterntltionalofficials to Russian gouermnmt officials to Russian citizens. This chaill combines with
existing theoretical ideas that Russians are readJl, but not willillg, to tlccept democratic
stalldards and that better performallce will illcrease trust (and tax payment) in
democmtic regimes. 1 use dma from the New Russia Barometer alld interuiews with
Russiall citizell5 to test this explallation, concluding that it is too early to tell if
persuasion methods haz l(' been e{fictiue, but that there is clejillite potential/lJl' the
dellelopment ofl'plulltillJi tax complimzce ill Russia.

T

he final days of 1991 brought unprecedented changes for Russia. The
fall of Soviet rule and the struggle toward Western-style democracyor at least away from communism-had been a long, hard, and trying
process for Russia and her citizens. National output shrank considerably,
inequaliry increased, and poverry became a realiry for many. These calamities
stem from the difficult yet necessary restructuring process-a process
marked by difficulties and sometimes failure. An area in which the country
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has met with extreme difficulty is taxation. Russia has been notorious for
widespread tax evasion and corruption, problems caused by ill-conceived
tax laws and a cultural tendency away from tax compliance (Aslund
2001). Contrary to popular belief, however, the past few years have also
seen surprising success in tax reform initiatives (Aslund 2001; Institute of
Economics, Moscow 2002).
Indeed, amidst all the suffering and calamity, Russia has been making
progress in its transition, and the new tax code adopted in stages between
1999 and 2003 is remarkable evidence of this progress. In· the course of
change, Russian officials have lowered both income and corporate tax
rates, tightened compliance by using personal identification numbers on
tax returns, and worked incessantly to improve federal-regional tax relationships. As a result, tax receipts have increased from 69% of expected tax
revenue in 1996 to around 120% of expected revenue in 2000, and the
growth rate of tax revenues almost tripled between 2001 and 2002 (Aaron
1996; Pravda 2002).
Some of this success is attributable to new tax laws that have increased
clarity and transparency while decreasing an almost intolerable tax burden.
Other success is attributable to higher oil prices and their subsequent
boost of the Russian economy. Even in the [lce of these successes, however,
Russian tax law will not become fully effective until the new laws meet
with voluntary compliance. Indeed, this aspect alone is the most significant
difference between the Russian tax systems and those operating in the
United States and Europe: in Russia, there is no cultural norm that one
must pay one's taxes; on the contrary, there is a norm that one should
evade paying taxes to the greatest extent possible.
How, then, does the Russian government overcome this obstacle? I
use an explanation of persuasion, or using dialogue to win a party over to
your beliefs, to demonstrate how the Russian government can facilitateand in some cases is already facilitating-voluntary tax compliance from
its citizens. This idea begins with international tax assistants who first
convince the Russian government that facilitating voluntary compliance
should be a priority. Russian governmcnr officials then take this idea down
to the level of citizellS, where they set up programs and launch campaigns to
garner voluntary compliance.
To provide a context to discuss this process, I will begin by laying out
some of the problems associated with Russian tax compliance, problems
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I identifY as "unwritten rules" of the tax system and "social!historical
rules" that have evolved over time. It is these rules the Russian government
is struggling against-a struggle made more difficult by the fact that these
rules have been cultivated flH' over a century, becoming embedded in
Russian culture over time.

The Russian Tax System: A Tiger Tamed?
For most of the 1990s, the Russian tax system gained a reputation for
ineffectiveness, complexity, and corruption-and for good reason. Tax
revenues were low (1997 tax collections were only 65.9% of those anticipated), tax laws were complicated and nearly incomprehensible without
the aid of an accountant, and deals both with and within government
helped facilitate low tax compliance (Institute of Economics 1997,5). The
tax system became a tiger imprisoning the government, rendering Russia
incapable of providing social benefits, offering economic incentives
through taxation, or attracting foreign investment through transparency.
With unemployment averaging 10.3% between 1990 and 1999, wage arrears equaling around $40,000 in 1997, and age-adjusted mortality
rising by 33% between 1990 and 1994, social benefits were sorely needed
yet crippled by low tax receipts (Eggars, Gaddy, and Graham 2004; International Labor Organization 1997).
Necessarily, the system needed reform: the tiger had to be tamed.
What lay in the heart of the tiger were tax institutions-the rules that
govern how people and organizations act within the state and society.
These ineffective institutions can be broken into three primary categories: faulty and uncoordinated "written rules" created by the government, "unwritten rules" that have arisen in both government and society,
and "social/historical rules" that have been centuries in the making. Of
these three, the Russian government has transformed written rules the
most, and this-reform has proven surprisingly successful. Voluntary compliance, however-the focus of this article-is primarily affected by
changes in unwritten and historical! social rules, which cannot be so
easily changed by a parliamentary vote. Unlike written rules, these two
categories have yet to be fully tamed. Before understanding how such
taming can occur, however, one must understand where all three types of
rules came from, what they are, and how they have crippled the Russian
tax system.
SIGMA
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Three Sources of the Complex System
Badly written rules. The Russian government is responsible for creating
the offIcial, wrirren rules of the Russian tax code. Since the fall of communism
in 1991, these rules have been amended, changed, and added to, subsequently becoming more complex if not mutated and greatly deformed.
Beneath all this adding and amending a number of forces were at work,
shaping the rule-making process until it became blind to the realities of
the system and produced rules that only added to the comp!exity.
One of these forces was government tolerance of an inadequate system.
According to Vitaly Artyokov, head of the Russian State l~lx Service umil
1997, the Russian government "passed a law whereby taxes are considered
to have been paid when a payment authorization is issued by the client,
not when the funds are received by the budget" (cited in Varnavskaya
1997, 8-9). In addition, firms apparently had a legal right not to pay, and
the government considered tax offenses only an economic crime, not a
crime against the state (Varnavskaya 1997, 8). One example of such
leniency was the corporate institution of "middlemen" used to avoid taxation. These middlemen buy products from a mother company, sell those
products, then use the resulting profits to obtain inputs and supplies for the
mother company. Thus, while the "middlemen" are actually working for
the company, they are legally tax exempt and not recorded on the books as
corporate agents (Filippov 1997,2). With a parliament overly sympathetic
to corporations making such lenient laws-which are ultimately contrary to
the goal of increasing tax revenue-there was bound to be confusion and
low compliance.
Another problem contributing to the undue complexity of the tax
system was lack of coordination between the legislature and executive
branch. Especially in the mid-1990s, the Russian legislature focused on
creating tax laws that were lenient while the executive branch focused
on compliance and rule of law. Explanations for the lack of political coordination include clashes between parties within the Duma and government officials who were put into office by-and therefore loyal tocertain companies. Between 1992 and 1995 especially, politics within the
Duma prevented the body from passing effective laws that might have
aided tax administration by the executive branch and greatly simplified
the system. Within parliament, the left and right prevented each other's
agendas from being passed, creating a blockade to effective tax reform

94

SIGMA

JACKSON

(Silenikov-Murylev and Trotlmov 1997, 1). In addition, early, lenient tax
laws enabled some companies to become wealthy and acquire power,
power that they then used to put certain candidates into office (Norberg
2004). Coming into office partly through the assistance of non-taxpayment, these politicians had a certain loyalty to the lax taxation laws
and little incentive to improve the system (Vishnevskaya 1997, 1).
In the face of lenient tax laws, the executive branch attempted to
ameliorate the problematic situation though strict enforcement of existing
tax law. The most extreme and notorious example of this is the Russian Tax
Police, which was given such wide discretion in collecting taxes that
Russian tax collection practices bore a striking resemblance to intimidation
by the mafia (Gregory and Brooke 2000). In addition, Russian tax administration became bloated over time, with a 5,000-position (17%)
increase in personnel between 1992 and 1995 (Aslund 1995, 194).
Behind this inconsistency berween creation and execution of the tax
laws lay problematic ideological divides regarding reform. A World Bank
report on assisting Russia's transition notes that "the period through late
1999 was characterized by ideological and political splits over market reforms, perceived risk of backsliding, frequent shakes and major decisions
within the government itself-including ... parliamentary opposition to
the reform effons" (Zanini 2003, 40). When the writers of rules lean
toward clemency and the executors toward severity, the rules tend to become muddled and interpreted disparately by the different groups.
Lack of government foresight is another factor that led to bad rules.
During perestroik{{, when Russia first began the transition to private enterprise and was only imagining what a new tax system ought to look like,
the government required little accountability from new enterprises, thus
failing to condition fIrms to the reality and necessity of taxation (Zanini
2003, 40). The Russian government also applied shortsighted crisis management to deal with financial emergencies, often introducing "short-term
and frequently improvised policy reaction ... rather than ... the implementation of a longer-term and comprehensive stabilization and reform
blueprint" (Zanini 2003, 40). This lack of foresight produced institutions
that were neither sustainable nor realistic for a market economy.
Unwritten rules. In addition to the obvious written tax rules of
the Russian government, there are also unwritten rules created by both
government and society that have hindered the Russian tax system. Some
SIGMA

95

TAX REFORM IN RUSSIA

of these were meant to be compatible with government regulations while
others were meant to help firms and individuals get around regulations.
One of these unwritten rules, non payments, has become extremely prevalent
in-and detrimental to-the Russian tax system. 'fhe system of nonpayments provides for noncash payment or payment through goods
instead of money, a practice engineered by businessmen and government
officials in an effort to decrease inflation but that has led only to currency
devaluation and defaults on loans (Aitken 200 I).
The Russian government's heavy involvement in the system of nonpayments has led to especially detrimental effects: the government is often
tardy with its payments for goods and services, which in turn makes
government-serving firms tardy with their tax payments (Pinto,
Drebentsov, and Morozov 2000). Local governments have played a part in
the promulgation of this system by allowing and even inventing nonmonetary tax payment systems-such as barter-to exact even marginal
tax compliance (Woodruff 2002). This creates a cycle that might work
theoretically (nobody pays nobody and all debts are forgiven), but that
in practice creates economic inefficiencies because many of the companies
to whom debts are forgiven are obsolete and unneeded (Aitken 2004).
In the end, the nonpayments system compounds fiscal difficulties
(Woodruff 2002).
In addition, the nonpayment system creates two business systems: one
monetary and the other barter-based (Randall 2001, 152). Barter systems
have become surprisingly prevalent in Russia, especially since the financial
crisis of 1998, and government tax provisions have only further encouraged
such practices. Barter systems are economically inefficient as they require
a double coincidence of wants; transaction costs increase greatly as both
buyers and sellers must find what they want from someone who wants
what they have to sell.
Keeping multiple, misleading business records is an unwritten rule
that has additionally plagued the Russian tax system. According to Linda
M. Randall, "several managers described their strategy of keeping three
sets of books: one for government tax collectors, one for organized crime,
and one for the manager" (Randall 2001, 151). These separate, misleading records are not considered dishonest, but simply an appropriate way of
doing business. This practice reflects the Russian approach to dealing with
taxes, an approach that can be traced back further than a century.
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Social and historical rules. Many of the problems and inefficiencies
that existed in the Russian tax system were present in the late 1800s during
Russia's last attempt at creating a comprehensive tax system. Then, like
today, increasing corporate taxes, collusion between taxpayers and tax
collectors, and a blurred line between tax avoidance (considered legal)
and tax evasion (illegal) plagued the system (IMF 1997; Bowman 1995,
272). Evidence of the same problems constantly reoccurring suggests
that many of the inefflciencies in the tax system are the result of Russian
culture and the Russian way of looking at taxation, which differs greatly
from social conceptions of taxation in other countries. An anecdote illustrates this point:
During a business semll1ar in Novgorod, Russia, managers
openly discussed the mechanism that they use to avoid paying taxes. A tlrst question directed to American seminar
leaders sought explanation of the ways U.S. managers avoid
paying taxes. The instructors admitted that there arc a number of loopholes that with a good accountant and tax planning allow Americans to reduce their tax burden and still hold
to the letter of the law. Still puzzled, the Russians asked how
Americans who cannot take advantage of loopholes avoid
taxes. In response, faculty members pointed out that Americans run the risk of getting into trouble with the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service if they attempt to avoid paying taxes. This exchange of information convinced the Russian managers that
Americans arc not aggressive and not good managers. (Randall
200 I, I ') 1)

While this attitude is prevalent among Russian business managers,
what is more disconcerting is its prevalence among Russian lawmakers.
The current attitude regarding tax avoidance among Russian citizens is exacerbated by lawmakers who appear more interested in accommodation
of tax evasion. than they are in combating it. Highly publicized leniency
for tax violators has produced a public that does not fear prosecution for
tax violations. Indeed, as noted by Erik Berglof and Romesh Vaitilingam,
"non-compliant taxpayers have interpreted each amnesty as a promise of further forgiveness, and acted accordingly" (BerglM and Vaitilingam 1999,
11). In closing, while Russian culture may have a historic trend toward tax
evasion, badly written rules and tax-evasion prone unwritten rules have
only worsened the situation.
SICMA
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Persuasion: The Key to Voluntary Compliance?
I take part in this debate by contending that legal reform alone cannot
change imbedded social norms or historical rules-Russian's historical
tendency to evade taxes. Social norms-and the unwritten laws contingent
upon them-are reconciled largely by administrative reform, not policy
(tax-code-changing) reform. I argue that persuasion is the guiding factor
in both motivating administrative reform and garnering voluntary compliance. This process, in effect, creates a persuasion chain, as represented in
the following diagram:
IIHernarional
Moncrary

Russian
Fedcral

Fund

Covernmenr

World Bank

Russian

USAID

Regional
Govcrnmenrs

Figure 1. Persuasion Chain
Persuasion chain. Here, persuasion "begins" with international
technical assistance-officials with the IMF, World Bank, USAID,
and OEeD, who transfer an understanding of economic principles.
International officials interact with Russian government officials, offering advice that is considered, analyzed, experimented upon, and
then absorbed into both Russian tax laws and administrative practices.
After incorporating these suggestions and ideas, built on an understanding of economic principles, Russian officials then transfer these
ideas, ways of thinking, and understanding about how new laws and
practices should function on to Russian taxpayers, persuading them to
comply with these new laws based on economic principles. Here, the
transferred idea is that the new tax system must act like a principled tax
system as opposed to simply looking like one. This persuasion is
directed both toward Russian companies, from which most tax receipts are received, and Russian individuals who pay taxes. Persuasion
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of both companies and the Russian population in general is achieved
through two primary methods: (a) literature, propaganda, and advertisement of the new changes in the tax law; and (b) assistance for taxpayers.
The first embodies an education initiative-programs to educate taxpayers as to what their responsibilities are, as well as how the changes are
in their favor. The second is also educational in nature, but focuses on the
nuances of compliance and is an attempt to show government support for
those who comply.
Existing explanations and extension. Explanations of voluntary tax
compliance within Russia have not been widely formulated or researched,
but scholars have done extensive work regarding Russian culture. Since I
intend to use a largely cultural argument for voluntary tax compliance,
I will huild upon this area of research to create a theoretical foundation.
Numerous articles in Russian culture literature address Russia's
prospects for effective democracy. One prominent study incorporating
numerous interviews with Russians from all walks of life found that Russians support democratic values but are unsure whether their current institutions will effectively uphold democracy (Carnaghan 2001). In other
words, Russian culture is prepared for democracy and the incorporation of
Western attitudes and behavior, but Russians themselves feel that their institutions are not capable of such behavior. The study further finds that
Russians see a strong need for institutional reform but have little interest
in changing these institutions. If, however, institutions were changed with
the assistance of international organizations and analysts, these reformed
institlltions might then foster democratic ideals. Ellen Carnaghan does
not consider this, but I would like to present it as a possibility.
Some theoretical support for this possibility is embedded in William
Mishler and Richard Rose's work on regime approval (Mishler and Rose
2002). These authors contend that the performance of institutionsparticularly eGOnomic performance-is the driving factor behind regime support. If democratic institutions perform well, then citizens will
support democratic regimes, while ill-performing democratic institutions
will have the opposite effect. Although this research focuses on regime
support as opposed to tax compliance, I contend that tax compliance
reflects regime support. After all, it only makes sense that support of
a democratic regime would be reflected by democratic behavior within
democratic institutions.
SIGMA
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An earlier study by Mishler and Rose investigated the role and status
of trust in post-Soviet countries, a concept central to the functioning of an
effective democracy (Mishler and Rose 1998; Bianco 1994). This study
found that post-Soviet citizens are not necessarily distrustful of their
government, but that they were not entirely trustful either. Instead, postSoviet citizens reflected skepticism, an in-between characteristic that
allows one to draw only limited predictions for the future of democracy in
post-Soviet countries. Although the study did not yield stro.ng predictive
results, it did effectively paint a picture of post-Soviet levels of trust. This
finding was reconfirmed, albeit not directly, in Carnaghan's study.
By combining these findings, one can form a picture of how politics
and democracy should work in Russia. Russian citizens are skeptical of
their government and believe current institutions will not effectively
support democracY" At the same time, Russians do harbor democratic
attitudes, and if democratic regimes performed well and brought economic
success, Russians would, in theory, fully support those regimes and institutions. Recently Russian institutions have performed well. Tax revenues
are high, compliance has greatly improved, the federal budget is under
control, and the Russian government can now payoff its loans instead of
defaulting on them. Will this shift create enough support for democratic
tax institutions to create voluntary compliance, or has voluntary compliance
actually preceded this shift? I contend that persuasion initially prompted
reform and now this reform may prompt a two-way process that will
eventually lead to greater compliance. More specifically, once persuasion
has convinced Russian taxpayers to comply (which some evidence already
supports), the improved tax performance created by persuasion will earn
added support and, by extension, promote even greater compliance. It is
important to note, however, that for this process to work persuasion at the
outset is a necessary requirement.
Method. To evalute the accuracy of my ideas I have examined data
on regime support, trust, and attitudes toward tax evasion from the New
Russia Btlrometer for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2003. In addition, I have interviewed Russian citizens in Moscow, investigating their
knowledge of and opinions on the recent tax reforms and whether they
have perceived increased compliance over time.
Data from the New Russia Btlrometer yields mixed evidence. Over
time, support for the democratic regime, and especially for the president,
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has increased (Figures 1 and 2). Presidential support, however, can be attributed to a change in the president as opposed to a change in the
population's perspective on the presidency in general. Regime support is
similarly ambiguous and may, as Mishler and Rose hypothesize, reflect increased performance
of the democratic system.
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It is difficult to draw conclusions concerning trust in the government
from the available data for a number of reasons. One problem is that the
New Russia Barometer asks about trust in specific groups or organizations
within government (Figure 3), as opposed to trust in government as a
whole. While this is an effective and precise manner of gauging trust, the
way it was carried out by the New Russia Barometer produces two potential issues of incommensurability. The New Russia Barometer is not consistent in the entities it asks respondents to evaluate. For example, between
1996 and 2000 the Barometer asked about the Duma or parliament in
general, while in 2001 and 2003 it asked about members of Parliament.
In addition, the Barometer asked about trust in international officials in
2000, but in no other years. A second problem with the New Russia
Barometer is that none of the questions it asks concern trust in tax collection officials, or any group whose approval level could give a very precise
idea of how much Russians trust the government to collect and use
taxes fairly. The best estimates of this kind of trust are likely derived from
public perceptions of the police, a part of which oversees tax collection
and administration, and of the Duma, which ultimately oversees changes
in tax law. Fortunately, the New Russia Barometer measured both groups
every year. Unfortunately, measurements indicate that trust in both
groups fell between 1996 and 2003. lrust in the Duma has plunged the
most, taking a large hit in 2001 when the New Russia Barometer began
asking about Duma members specifically as opposed to the Duma in
general. Trust in the President has increased substantially since 2000,
reaching a trust level of 60% in 2003 (Figure 3). Also included is a measure of trust in entrepreneurs, a trust that has increased over time and may
be related to higher corporate compliance with tax laws. Most of these
numbers, however, leave us with more puzzles than before. The data from
the New Russia Barometer cannot clearly answer why trust in tax law
administrators (police) and tax lawmakers (the Duma) has decreased while
support for a democratic regime in general has increased.
Only one question from the New Russia Barometer directly addresses tax
evasion, and, unfortunately, the Barometer asked this question only in 1998
and 2001. According to this data (Figure 5), general attitudes have changed
slightly during that time. Respondents felt that tax laws were more strictly
enforced in 2001 than in 1998 and that it has become more difficult to
evade taxes by paying a bribe. However, only 2% more respondents felt
SIGMA 103
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there was no need to pay. In other words, the Russian population has seen
tax administration increase, but this increased administration has not
brought about a shift towards voluntary compliance or a sentiment that
taxes should be paid. This is an interesting finding, suggesting that although
there is greater perceived enforcement this has not been accompanied by
cultural change or the emergence of a belief that taxes should be paid.

A deeper look into the situation through interviews
Interviews with Russian citizens and officials shed further light on this
relationship between the perception of increased enforcement and a concurrent lack of change in cultural attitudes. While speaking of corporate
(as opposed to private) taxes, one Russian respondent expressed the view
that the new, lower tax laws made it easier to own a business and pay taxes;
it was the laws alone, and not attitudes, that have increased the number of
businesses and amount of business tax compliance. Along those same
lines, Derek Norberg, executive secretary of the Russian American Pacific
Partnership, expressed that businesses now see it as profitable to pay taxes:
doing so is less costly, increases transparency, and increases the company's
legitimacy in the eyes of the community and international investors
(Norberg 2004). The attitudes of businessmen have not changed, but the
new laws and lower tax rates have made compliance a mllch more feasible
and profitable option. This same idea has been expressed by other oHicials
and citizens; the new tax rates make it more profitable for companies to
pay taxes (Dobrolyubova 2004).
In addition to lower rates making compliance easier, new administrative measures have made compliance imperative. For example, previolls
income tax laws left a gaping hole for Russian citizens with more than one
job: They could report only one form of employment on tax forms and
Russian officials would never know that they had two or three other jobs.
Recently, however, Russia has instituted a tracking system that identifIes
each individual with a number. This system has made it more difficult to
hide multiple jobs and income sources. Thus, both statistical and qualitative evidence seem to suggest that Russian attitudes toward paying taxes
have changed very little and that any increased compliance must be attributed to a change in laws.
The evidence of increased perception of enforcement and increased
compliance in general rdlects an overall trend in Russian domestic
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government. Known as rutin's "rule of law," this is an ideal strongly
enforced by rutin in many facets of Russian society, including the media,
elections, crime, and, of course, tax payment. Strong administrative
measures such as the arrest of Yukos Oil Company owner Mikhail
Khodorkovsky have shown rutin's desire to come down hard on tax
offenders, and the public largely supports the government in this endeavor. Currently, 36% of Russians support the government against
Yukos, 8% support Yukos against the government, and 17% are unsure
(Public Opinion Foundation 2004). This trend, however, may simply be
a starting point for garnering compliance. In the United States, most of us
would say we comply because there is widespread knowledge of the IRS
and how it punishes noncompliance. If a similar knowledge is cultivated
in Russia, voluntary compliance may form over time. This change, however, must be facilitated through persuasion, persuasion the government
has already initiated through a series of programs.
Studies conducted by the World Bank point out the importance of
programs geared toward creating voluntary compliance and indicate that
Russia has launched educational initiatives and set up taxpayer services
within some regions-with international pressure (Gill 2003). Before
2000, compliance initiatives were not a high priority for the Russian
government. The government saw tax payment as simply an obligation of
all Russian citizens to keep the government running; it would be ludicrous
to fund programs geared toward getting citizens to pay taxes with the very
funds these programs were meant to raise. Over time, however, the Russian government saw the importance of voluntary compliance-a change
that came about primarily through international diJ!ogue as officials with
the World Bank convinced Russian government officials that voluntary
compliance is an area of the tax system that must be addressed, even if
doing so requires the paradoxical use of taxpayers' rubles (Dobrolyubova
2004). Since then the government has lunched advertisement campaigns
to educate Russians about the new tax laws. These campaigns have included slogans such as "pay your taxes Jnd sleep calmly" and analogies
such as an apple slice that illustrates the decrease in income tax
(Dobrolyubova 2004). Other programs have included taxpayer services,
where tax inspectorates can answer questions for taxpayers, and even a tax
book for school children-an educational initiative meant to teach children at an early age the importance of paying taxes.
S[CMA
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Perhaps it is too early to observe the efTects of these voluntary compliance initiatives. Indeed, for a country with a historical trend away from tax
compliance, such initiatives will take time and may have a limited effect
at first. I contend that this premature state is largely responsible for the
mixed statistical resul ts presented in Figures 2-5 and the tremendous eviderlCe that new laws alone account for compliance. Over time, new laws
coupled with new administration-and especially administration initiatives geared toward voluntary compliance-have a potential for success.
This is pardy supported by Mishler and Rose's theory: the 'positive economic performance of a regime (in this case, the present tax system) will
elicit support for that system or regime. This support, coupled with compliance programs, could in turn create more support-support that can
change the thinking of taxpayers over time. Aside from this theoretical
development, tax scholars note that even the United States went through
a period of heavy corruption and Mafia infiltration dming the 1920s, yet
has since developed an honest tax system (Swift 2004). Thus, there may
be hope for Russia as well.

Evidence of a Persuasion Chain.
While only future research can fully examine the persuasion relationship between Russian government and citizens, some evidence already
supports the persuasion chain laid out earlier in the chapter, especially
as it pertains to voluntary compliance. As noted previously, before 2000
the Russian government did not see voluntary compliance as a priority;
it required international dialogue and persuasion, primarily by the World
Bank, to convince the government to fully address the issue (Dobrolyubovna 2004). Since then, the Russian government has launched numerous
advertisement campaigns and initiated taxpayer services to foster voluntary compliance. While many of these initiatives have been geared toward
the population in general, some are meant to persuade businesses specifically, especially the taxpayer service programs. Besides income taxes,
which are usually paid through companies, Russian citizens pay few direct
taxes. This may seem to make tax advertisements geared toward the general population pointless, but many business owners and enrrepreneurs are
included in the general population. Thus, this completes the persuasion
chain as it applies to voluntary compliance.
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This article has briefly explored the area of voluntary tax compliance
in Russia, concluding that conflicting statistical evidence suggests a need
for further research in this area to determine the relationship between
administrative reform, tax policy reform, and the growth of voluntary
compliance. At the same time, qualitative evidt>nce lends support to the
idea of a persuasion chain linking international organizations, the Russian
government, and Russian citizens. Although tax compliance has increased
in Russia, the nation has a potential for even greater tax compliance, a
potential that, if realized, may be an important step towards consolidating
democracy in Russia.
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